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COMPETITION FOR MANAGEMENT THROUGH PROXY
SOLICITATION
By Frank D. Emerson* and Franklin C. Latchamt
T HE 1954 "proxy season,"' highlighted by the titanic struggle
between Robert R. Young and the former management of the
New York Central Railroad, doubtless occasioned far more reports
and comments in the public press regarding proxy contests than
ever before. Shortly after the close of the New York Central con-
test one newspaper columnist wrote that Mr. Young proposed next
to enter the oil industry, inferentially by means of another proxy
contest Still another columnist, following announcement of the
defeat of the former New York Central Railroad management,
asserted that a contest for the Pennsylvania Railroad may be
expected in the wake of the proxy contest defeats of the former
managements of the New York Central, the New York, New Haven
& Hartford, and the Minneapolis & St. Louis railroads Currently,
the public press is carrying news stories concerning the opening
efforts of Louis E. Wolfson, president and chairman of the world's
largest marine construction firm, Merritt-Chapman and Scott, to
take over the billion-dollar a year mail order house of Montgom-
ery Ward & Co. and to oust its chairman, Sewell Avery.'
Examination of the proxy contests that took place during the
*Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati; member, Ohio Bar. B.A., 1938, Uni-
versity of Akron; LL.B., 1940, Western Reserve University.
tMember of the San Francisco Bar. B.S.L., 1943, LL.B., 1944, University of Wash-
ington; J.S.D., 1951, Yale University Law School.
1 The "proxy season" is March through May, and so called for the reason that
approximately two-thirds of the proxy statements filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission are filed during that period.
2 Winchell, Oil Is Next on List for Robert Young, Cleveland News, June 22, 1954,
p. 13, cols. 7 and 8.
3 Sullivan's Broadway, Cincinnati Times-Star, August 31, 1954, p. 17, col. 1.
4 See for example, Business Struggle Is Launched - Challenge Faced by Ward,
Cincinnati Enquirer, August 27, 1954, p. 34, col. 1.
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first half of 1954 and the year 1953 therefore appears timely, and
should afford additional insight into the matter of whether the
Securities and Exchange Commission's Regulation X-14 govern-
ing the solicitation of proxies' is in general continuing to operate
effectively in stimulating corporate or shareholder democracy!
More specifically, is there substantial reason to believe that the
Regulation is inspiring present management to provide, or afford-
ing a medium for obtaining elsewhere, the vigorous and faithful
leadership so essential to the growth and survival of our capitalis-
tic democracy.7 At this writing, moreover, material from the
writer's prior survey of 1951 and 1952 proxy contests is available
for the purpose of comparing aggregate and individual figures
respecting the 1953 and 1954 contests with the contests that took
place in 1951 and 1952.' In addition, comparable data relating to
1953 and 1954 contests provides, of course, a more precise index
than publicity for measuring the statistical scope and the implica-
tions of the recently concluded Young-New York Central contest.
To facilitate comparison with the prior survey the writers pro-
pose in this article to present generally parallel background and
solicitation material on the 1953 and 1954 contests, and at the
same time to note especially novel further developments. This
approach should furnish an adequate basis for comment and
conclusions addressed to the questions already posed with refer-
ence to the impact of Regulation X-14 during 1953 and the
first half of 1954.
5 The SEC's Regulation X-14 and its Schedule 14A are applicable only with
respect to the solicitation of proxies for securities listed and registered on a national
securities exchange, securities of companies registered under the PUBLIC UTILITY HOLD-
INC ACT OF 1935, and securities of companies registered under the INVESTMENT COMPANY
ACT OF 1940.
0 See EMERSON AND LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: A BROADER OUTLOOK FOR
CORPORATIONS (1954) and CORPORATE DEMOCRACY, 4 VA. L. WEEKLY DICTA COMPILA-
TION (1953).
Emerson and Latcham, Proxy Contests: A Study in Shareholder Sovereignty,




Initial orientation will again sought to be provided by presen-
tation of such comparative background data as (1) number of
non-management proxy statements filed, (2) assets in dollars of
the companies involved, (3) sales in dollars of the companies,
(4) industries in which the companies operated, (5) states of
incorporation and cumulative voting rights, (6) number of share-
holders of record of companies affected, and whether an annual
or special meeting was involved.
Number of Non-management Proxy Statements
During 1953 only 21 non-management proxy statements were
filed, a relatively substantial decline from the 26 and 28 non-
management proxy statements filed in 1951 and 1952, respec-
tively.' Except for 1946 when 21 filings were also effected, the
1953 figure represents the lowest number of filings at any time
since 1943.1" While 23 non-management proxy statements were
filed during the first six months of 1954, no ultimate substantial in-
crease in non-management filings for 1954 is suggested when it is
considered that the first six months of the year include the "proxy
season" and that the largest number of filings in any year since
1943 was 32 in 1947, when, incidentally, the total number of
proxy statements, management and non-management, recorded by
SEC was only 1,645. Contrary, therefore, to comments that con-
tinue to be made, it would not appear from the 1953 and 1954
figures that opposition groups are using X-14 in any substantial
measure as an instrument for harassment generally of companies
subject to SEC proxy regulation. The increased coverage of proxy
contests in newspapers and magazines probably is due to the cir-
0 Id. at 398-99. The prior article reports the filing of 25 and 27 non-management
proxy statements during 1951 and 1952 based on data obtained from the SEC and
elsewhere. It has since been learned, however, that a non-management proxy statement
was also filed in 1951 with respect to Trans-Lux Corporation and that in 1952 a non-
management proxy statement was filed as to Pennsylvania Coal & Coke Corporation.
The previous figures have therefore been adjusted to 26 filings for 1951 and .28 for 1952.
'OId. at 399.
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cumstance that the contests by their nature are often spectacular,
and therefore "good copy" for the public and business press.
Assets in Dollars of the Companies Involved
The 1953 non-management proxy statements filed with SEC
related to 18 different companies," while those filed during 1954's
first six months were submitted with reference to 20 individual
companies. The comparable figures for 1951 and 1952, as ad-
justed, were 25 companies during each of the two years.
Although a 1953 decline in the number of companies affected
by non-management proxy statements is reflected, there was at the
same time an increase in the dollar amount of assets involved,
and also a further asset increase in the first half of 1954. The total
assets figures for 1952 and 1953 companies, with AT&T's more
than ten billion dollars in assets removed for each year, were
quite close, namely, $2.7 and $2.9 billion, respectively.12 Total
assets affected for filings during the first six months of 1954
were already slightly higher than 1952 and 1953, excluding
AT&T, and stood at $3.0 billion.
With the number of companies decreasing and assets increasing,
it is of course apparent that somewhat larger companies were
involved in the 1953 filings, and moreover the same trend con-
tinued in 1954. This result in turn is due in large part to the pres-
ence of a relatively high number of large railroads among the
1953 and 1954 companies."
Insight into the proportions of the Young-New York Central
contest is suggested by the fact that, while average asests for the
1953 and 1954 companies, AT&T excluded, amount to about $162
million, as compared to the 1951 and 1952 asset average of $64
11 The figure 18 excludes a non-management proxy statement relating to the Ameri-
can Woolen Company which was filed on December 29, 1953, but pertained to the
annual meeting to be held on April 20, 1954. Four other non-management proxy state-
ments with reference to the same annual meeting were filed in 1954.
12 Op. Cit. supra, note 7, at 400. Footnote 7 at 400.
Is Inlra, notes 21 and 22.
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and $114 million," New York Central's assets alone were $1.9
billion at the close of 1953.
Sales in Dollars of the Companies
Total sales of the companies involved in proxy contests covered
by Regulation X-14 were successively substantially higher during
each of the three years following 1951. For 1951 the total sales
or revenue dollars, as adjusted, amounted to $702 million, while
the comparable figures, with AT&T omitted from 1952 and 1953
totals, were: 1952, $934 million; 1953, $1,321; and the first six
months of 1954, $1,613 million. In our prior survey-article it
was pointed out that, with gross national product at $284.2 and
$329.2 billion and profits for manufacturing firms after taxes at
7.1% and 4.8% of sales in 1950 and 1951, respectively, it was
most unlikely that more than .01% and .06% of 1950 and 1951
gross national product were affected by the 1951 and 1952 non-
management proxy solicitations under Regulation X-14." Gross
national product and profits after taxes to sales for manufacturers
in 1952 were about $348.0 billion and 4.3%, with the result that
even with the 1953 increase in sales dollars affected, not more
than .01% of gross national product was involved in 1953 X-14
solicitations. 6 Inasmuch as gross national product for 1953 has
been placed at $367.0 billion, it again remains unlikely that the
1954 solicitations may be validly regarded as having any notice-
able affect on the nation's productive capacity.
With average sales for the 1953 and 1954 companies, AT&T
excluded, at about $77 million, as compared to the 1950 and
1951 sales averages of $29 and $39 million, respectively, for the
1951 and 1952 companies, 17 the stature of the New York Central
solicitation becomes more apparent. Central's sales or 1953 rev-
enue was approximately $807 million dollars.
14 Op. cit. supra note 7, at 400.
15 Op. cit. supra note 7, at 4034.
16 1952 gross national product is reported in the ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT
(JANUARY 1954), p. 167, table G-1. 1952 profits after Federal taxes to sales are shown
id., p. 216, table G-46. Table G-1 also places 1953 gross national product at $367.0 billion.
17 Op. cit. supra note 7, at 402.
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Industries in Which the Companies Operated
During both 1951 and 1952 50% of the companies involved
in non-management proxy solictations under X-14 were manufac-
turing companies."8 Approximately the same relationship was
maintained during 1953 and the first six months of 1954, for in
1953 half of the companies affected were manufacturers and in
the first six months of 1954 manufacturing accounted for 45%
of the companies.
In 1951 manufacturing assets, however, were only 12% and
in 1952 only 4% of total assets, while 1951 manufacturers' sales
were 57% and in 1952 their sales were 15% of totals, excluding
AT&T."9 Again in 1953 and 1954 there was a generally similar
relationship. 1953 manufacturing assets represented 6% of the
total assets involved, and in 1954 they were 11%. 1953 sales
amounted to 12% of all sales affected by X-14 solicitations, and
1954 sales, 28%.
As was shown by the results of the 1951-1952 survey, trans-
portation companies, principally railroads, constituted about one-
third of the companies involved, 86.5% of total assets, and 62%
of total sales or revenue. These relationships also continued during
1953 and 1954. In 1953 33% of the companies were either rail-
roads or electric railways, their assets amounted to 91%, and
their sales 73% of the year's totals.2" During the first six months
18'Id. at 406.
19 Id. at 406-7.
20 1953 manufacturing companies and 1953 railroads and electric railways involved
in X-14 non-management proxy solictations were:
Manufacturing:
Altes Brewing Company Hoe & Hoe, Inc., R.
Atlantic Oil Corp. Indiana Steel Products Co.
Bishop Oil Co. Lanston Monotype Machine Co.
Follansbee Steel Corporation Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Gobel, Inc., Adolph Corporation
Railroads and electric railways:
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company
Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co.
Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.
Philippine Railway Company




of 1954 railroads and electric railways accounted for 30% of all
companies, and their assets and sales 88%o and 65% of the respec-
tive totals,"' the figures being exclusive of one actual and another
nominal steamship company. 2
Depressed industries, therefore, continued to have heavy repre-
sentation among companies involved in non-management solicita-
tions, with the railroads predominating. While, contrary to 1951-
1952, no airlines were among the 1953-1954 companies, their
places were taken by steamship companies, another generally
depressed industry.
States of Incorporation and Cumulative Voting Rights
Delaware, not unexpectedly, continued in 1953 and the first
half of 1954 as the most frequently recurring state of incorpora-
tion. But as in 1951 and 1952 there was a wide representation of
states of incorporation among the 38 1953 and 1954 companies,
namely, 16 different states.
23
21 1954 manufacturing companies and 1954 railroads and electric railways involved
in X-14 non-management proxy solicitations were:
Manufacturing:
Advance Aluminum Castings Corp. Decca Records, Inc.
Amer. Car & Foundry Company Great American Industries, Inc.
Amer. Woolen Co. Hoe & Co., Inc., R.
Baker-Raulang Company Michigan Steel Tube Products Co.
Cornell-Dubilier Electric Corp.
Railroads and electric railways:
Central of Georgia Ry. Co.
Chicago, South Shore & South Bend Railroad
Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Co.
New York Central Railroad Company
New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company
Pittsburgh Railways Co.
22The steamship companies were: Detroit & Cleveland Navigation Company, a
nominal steamship, but more in the nature of an investment, company, and American
Hawaiian Steamship Co.
23 The 1953 states of incorporation, with number of companies incorporated, were:
Calif. 1 Ind. 1 Mo. 2 Va. 1
Conn. 1 Kans. 1 N. Y. 4
Del. 5 Mich. 1 Pa. 1
The 1954 states of incorporation, with number of companies incorporated, were:
Conn. 1 Ind. 1 N.J. 2
Del. 4 Mass. 1 N.Y. 3
Ga. 1 Mich. 2 Ohio 1
Iln. 2 Minn. 1 Pa. 1
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Of the 16 states in which the 38 companies were incorporated,
three had no provisions for cumulative voting,24 six had permissive
cumulative voting,2" and only seven had mandatory cumulative
voting requirements."e As in 1951 and 1952, there was therefore
no basis in the 1953 and first half of 1954 solicitations for con-
cluding that mandatory cumulative voting provisions are a major
factor in the occurance of proxy contests. Rather the chief back-
ground component continued to be operation in a depressed
industry.27
Number of Shareholders of Record and Type of Meeting
The 1951 and 1952 figures for average number of shareholders
of record, excluding AT&T, were 6,010 and 7,995, rsepectively."
Shareholders of record in the companies effected by non-manage-
ment solicitation in 1953 and the first half of 1954 were, exclud-
ing again AT&T, remarkably close; the 1953 average being 5,369
and the 1954 average, 6,199. The magnitude of the Young-New
York Central contest is once more indicated by the circumstance
that at the close of 1953 Central had 44,641 shareholders of
record.
While 1951 and 1952 presented four instances of solicitations
for special meetings at the call of non-management groups, there
were only two such solicitations in 1953 and the first half of 1954,
one having taken place each year. In 1953 there was a non-man-
agement solicitation for a special shareholders meeting for the
purpose of reinstating the discharged president of R. Hoe & Co.
and removing his successor and the successor's associates. 29 In
1954 there was a non-management solicitation by Graham-New-
man Corporation, a registered investment company, seeking a
24 The states with no provision for cumulative voting were: Conn., Ga., and Mass.
25 States with permissive cumulative voting were: Del., Ind., Minn., N. J., N. Y.,
and Va.
26 Cumulative voting is mandatory in Calif., Ill., Kans., Mich., Mo., Ohio, and Pa.
27 Op. Cit. supra note 7, at 434.
28 Id. at 409.
29 See R. Hoe & Co., Inc., non-management proxy filings for 1953.
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special meeting of shareholders of American Hawaiian Steamship
Company for the purpose of affording an opportunity to vote on
resolutions dealing with matters of policy.80
SOLICITATION DATA
Matters to be examined here include: (1) security holdings and
occupations of the non-management soliciting groups, (2) volume
and timing of soliciting material, (3) objectives, (4) personal
solicitation and solicitation expenses, (5) results of voting by
security holders, and (6) contest summary.
Security Holdings and Occupations
Non-management groups' security holdings remained low, but
not infrequently were in excess of management's. In 12 instances
1953 and 1954 non-management holdings were less than 1% of
the outstanding stock,81 and in another 12 they were less than
10%.32 The only occasion in which a non-management group held
more than 17% was the 1953 Atlantic Oil Corp. solicitation which
was unopposed. Six groups had holdings of from 10 to 17%, the
17% group being the Alleghany-Young-Kirby Ownership Board
which opposed the New York Central management.83
20American Hawaiian Steamship Co. non-management proxy material filed by
Graham-Newman Corporation in 1954.
B' Security holdings under 1%:
Altes Brewing Company Rexall Drug
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Amer. Car & Foundry
AT&T Amer. Woolen Co.
Bishop Oil Co. Cornell-Dubilier Elect.
Gobel, Inc., Adolph Lehigh Valley Coal Co.
Missouri Pacific Rr. Mich. Steel Tube Prod.
82 Security holdings under 10%, but 1% or more:
Follansbee Steel Baker-Raulang
Hoe & Co., Inc., R. Chicago, S. Shore & S. Bend
Hudson & Manhattan Rr. Decca Records, Inc.
Missouri-Kansas-Texas Rr. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry.
Twentieth Century-Fox Pittsburgh Rys.
American Hawaiian SS.
S3 The other five of the six groups holding from 10 to 17% of the securities
outstanding were:
Ind. Steel Products Co. 14%
Pig'n Whistle Corporation 15%
Associated Gen. Utilities 12%
D & C Navigation 16%
N. Y., New Haven & Hartford 15%
1954]
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In the 1953 and first half of 1954 non-management solicita-
tions, as in 1951 and 1952, business men, attorneys, and securities
broker-dealers accounted occupationally for two-thirds or more
of the non-management nominees for directorships or security
holders' committee members. 4 Again in 1953 a labor union repre-
senting AT&T employees filed a proxy statement in connection
with solicitation of proxies in support of its proposal that social
security benefits should not be deducted from company pension
benefits payable to rank and file employees. 5 In 1954 an invest-
ment company, Graham-Newman Corporation, filed a non-manage-
ment proxy statement with respect to the American Hawaiian
Steamship Co. in connection with its solicitation in favor of a
special meeting of security holders and its advocacy of a policy
of no further investment by the management in shipping ven-
tures and management adoption of a program permitting each
shareholder to obtain direct control over his full share of the
company's non-shipping assets.3 Another 1954 instance of the
filing of a non-management proxy statement by a corporation was
Textron, Inc.'s filing with reference to the American Woolen Co. 7
84 Occupation Year 0 Year 0
Business men 1953 55 1954 40
Attorneys 1953 18 1954 21
Securities brokers-dealers 1953 12 1954 8
85 For a synopsis of the labor unions' 1952 solicitation, see op. cit. supra, note 7 at
422-3. The union did not solicit in 1954, the SEC having held that AT&T inclusion of
the union proposal in its 1954 mangement proxy statement would not be required
under a 1954 amendment to the shareholder proposal rule. See in this connection Bayne,
Caplin, Emerson and Latcham, Proxy Regulation and the Rule Making Process: The
1954 Amendments, 40 VA. L. REv. 387, 428-29 (1954).
8 Graham-Newman Corporation also filed a non-management proxy statement in
1948 relating to the New Amsterdam Casualty Co. However, none of the nation's 32
largest open and closed end investment companies filed any non-management proxy
soliciting material. See Emerson, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A System for
Shareholder Checks and Corporate Balance,' ANALYSTS JOURNAL, 87, 91 (November
1953).
37 Textron, Inc., also offered to exchange its shares for shares of American Woolen
Co., and therefore likewise filed with the SEC a registration statement covering its
shares. See prospectus of Textron, Inc., dated March 1, 1954, with March 5, 1954, and
April 5, 1954, supplement.
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Volume and Timing of Soliciting Material
In 1953 ten of the non-management solicitations were made by
means of only one mailing to security holders, the single mailing
averaging slightly more than 31/> pages. Five other solicitations
in the same year used from two to eight mailings consisting of on
the average of 17 pages. 8 While single mailings averaging some-
what more than three and a half pages were employed in eight of
the 1954 solicitations, nine sent out from three to seven mailings
which averaged 26 pages. 9 Elapsed time from the first mailing
to the meeting date ranged from 8 to 48 days in 1943 and from
6 to 53 days in 1954.
Objectives
Eight of the 1953 solicitations by non-management groups
were in support of proposals. One of the eight sought authoriza-
tions to representation in a reorganization proceedings under Chap-
ter X of the National Bankruptcy Act." In connection with three
other of the eight proposals the shareholders had also availed
themselves of the provisions of the shareholder proposal rule with
the result that their proposals were also carried in the manage-
ment proxy statement." 1953 brought 11 non-management solici-
as The 1953 multiple mailing non-management solicitations related to:
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Hoe & Hoe, Inc., R.
Ind. Steel Products Co.
Missouri-Kansas-Texas Rr.
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.
s0 The 1954 multiple mailing non-management solicitations related to:
Amer. Hawaiian SS. Co.
Amer. Woolen Co.
Decca Records, Inc.
D. & C. Navigation Co.
Hoe & Co., Inc., R.
Lehigh Valley Coal Co.
Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry.
New York Central Rr. Co.
New York, New Haven & Hartford
40 See 1953 non-management proxy statement filed with reference to Adolph Gobel,
Inc.
41 The three 1953 companies whose management proxy statement reflected use of
the shareholder proposal provisions of Rule X-14A-8 were Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe, Follansbee Steel, and Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.
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tations for the purpose of electing directors, representation only
and less than a majority of directors having been involved in six
instances" and control or a majority desired in five solicitations.'
During the first half of 1954 five solicitations in support of pro-
posals took place, only one reflecting use of the shareholder
proposal provisions of Rule X-14A-8." In the same period there
were 14 efforts to elect directors, six with only representation in
issue45 and eight being contests for control."
Personal Solicitation and Solicitation Expenses
In almost every 1953 and 1954 solicitation personal solicitation
was carried on. Solicitation expenses averaged $2,829 for 12 of
the 1953 non-management solicitations, while the average for 11
of the first half of 1954 solicitations amounted to $4,412. Other
expenses besides those directly attributable to solicitation may run
very high. It was reported that both sides in the New York Central






Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.
4s The 1953 solicitations for control involved:
Atlantic Oil Corp. (unopposed)
Hudson & Manhattan Ry.
Ind. Steel Products Co.
Missouri Pacific Ry.
Rexall Drug, Inc.
44 The company referred to was Amer. Woolen Co.
45 The 1954 solicitations for representation were:




Michigan Steel Tube Products Co.
Pittsburgh Rys. Co.
46 First half of 1954 solicitations for control pertained to:
Chicago, South Shore & South Bend Rr.
Decca Records, Inc.
D. & C. Navigation Co.
Hoe & Co., Inc., R.
Lehigh Valley Coal Co.
New York Central Railroad Co.
New York, New Haven & Hartford Rr. Co.
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contest spent over a half a million dollars, about $300,000 being
devoted in each instance to newspaper advertisements alone. 7 The
expense of conducting a non-management solicitation therefore
continues to be a major obstacle.
Results of Voting
None of the proposals, in connection with which non-manage-
ment proxy statements were filed, carried in either 1953 or the
first half of 1954. They did, however, continue to draw substan-
tially more votes in most cases than proposals not supported by
non-management solicitation. All but one of the 1953 solicitations
for minority representation elected a minimum of one director,
48
and in not less than three instances the 1954 solicitations for rep-
resentation elected at least one director. 9 While there were no
successful 1953 non-management control solicitations, the results
of the 1954 efforts to gain control were almost phenominal, at least
75% of the eight groups having achieved their objective and
defeated the incumbent management."0
Contest Summary
Certain aspects of the non-management solicitations in the 18
months period are noteworthy. There was the 1953 decline in
filings, followed, however, by the increase indicated for 1954.
4T See Brooks, A Reporter at Large: The Great Proxy Fight, THE NEW YORKER,
p. 28 (July 3, 1954). The article also presents a detailed account of the contest for the
New York Central. See also, How Young Got the Votes, FORTUNE, p. 87 (August 1954).
48 The exception was the Twentieth Century-Fox opposition solicitation and see
supra footnote 42. In addition, the management resolution to repeal cumulative voting
carried. The opposition was lead by Charles Green, who had participated in the Twin
City Rapid Transit Co. and the United Cigar-Whelan Stores Corp. proxy contests.
49 At least one director was elected in 1954 contests involving Advance Aluminum
Castings Co., Baker-Raulang Co., and Amer. Woolen Co.
50 The six successful 1954 control contests perta i,' d to:
Hoe & Co., Inc., R.
Lehigh Valley Coal Co.
Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co.
New York Central Rr. Co.
New York, New Haven & Hartford Ry
D. & C. Navigation Co.
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In 1953 no contests for control attempted by non-management
groups were successful, but in 1954 at least six or 75o were
victorious. Proxy contests continued to be relatively few in num-
ber, the head of a paid proxy soliciting firm having stated that
"What surprises me, in view of how easy it is to start a proxy
fight these days, is not how many there are, but how few."'" Far
from feeling that proxy contests are always harmful, as had in
the past been asserted, another commentator said, "I can't think
offhand where the stockholder was not better off, in dividend
yield or in market value, after the fight than he was before.""
Depressed industries continued to be heavily represented among
companies involved in proxy contests, and individual companies
with low or no earnings reoccurred." Two new solicitations tech-
niques that were employed were the use in the New York Central
contest by both the opposition and the management of full page
newspaper advertisements in daily papers, and publications pre-
sented in the form of shareholder newspapers in the New York
Central and R. Hoe & Co., Inc. contests. It was most encouraging
to note that in two contests, R. Hoe & Co., Inc., in 1954 and
Twentieth Century-Fox in 1953, The Value Line Investment Sur-
vey, which is affiliated with the Value Line Funds, took a definite
position on issues involved."
Although mandatory cumulative voting requirements in certain
states continued not to be a significant factor from the standpoint
51 J. C. Perham, Revolt ol the Stockholder, BARRON'S, p. 3, April 26, 1954, quoting
George R. Squires of Squires & Co.
52 Id. at 22.
53 One of the companies, Lehigh Valley Coal Co., is one of the 10 companies whose
stock has paid no dividends since its listing on the New York Stock Exchange. Three
such companies were involved in the 1951.52 non-management solicitations. Op. cit.
supra note 7 at 408.
54 After the close of the R. Hoe & Co., Inc. contest THE CORPORATE DIRECTOR, pub-
lished by the American Institute of Management carried comment on the Hoe solicita-
tion. See THE CORPORATE DIRECTOR (May 1954). For an account of the Hoe contest,
a sucessful effort by the ousted president to regain control, see He Fought His Way
Back, BUSINESS WEEK, p. 70 (May 1, 1954). For a contest in which a company presi-
dent, as leader of a minority group, was unsuccessful in fighting his way hack, see
1953 Indiana Steel Products Proxy material.
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of companies incorporated in these states not being subject to more
proxy contests than companies chartered in states with permissive
or no cumulative voting provisions, two attacks on cumulative
voting developed in 1954. Business Week, in an article subse-
quently adverted to in Georgeson & Co.'s Trends, made reference
to "trickiness" in cumulative voting as employed in the New
York, New Haven & Hartford Rr. contest by the successful oppo-
sition group.5" Yet analysis of the actual manner of cumulative
voting by the opposition indicates that they merely voted in accord-
ance with the widely cited formula for cumulative voting." The
other inroad on cumulative voting was a bill to amend mandatory
cumulative voting out of the National Banking Act.57
CONCLUSION
Competition is the prime requisite of a free enterprise society.
Price, product, and other components of democratic capitalism
are compelled to compete. No reason for exempting management
is apparent, and, moreover, competition for management through
proxy solicitation continues to give promise of stimulating present
management to provide, or affording a medium for obtaining else-
where, the vigorous and faithful leadership so essential to the
growth and survival of our capitalistic democracy."'
55 BUSINESS WEEK, p. 68, May 1, 1954, for article entitled A Handbook to Cumulative
Voting. See also Georgeson & Co., TRENDS (June 1954).
50 WILLIAMS, CUMULATIVE VOTING (1951) 40-42.
57 S. 3158, 83D Congress (1954) and Report No. 1629 (Senate) 83D Congress, 2d
Session (1954).
5sProxy contest expenses continued to be a substantial burden to opposition
groups. For proposals to equalize treatment of non-mangement and management groups,
see Footnote 7 at 435-36 regarding proportional and minimum percentage reimburse-
ments. See also Gilbert, The Real Meaning of Proxy Battles, INVESTOR, p. 45, 46-47
(July 1954).
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